外滩金融峰会-马云为什么在外滩金融峰会上大骂监管部门？
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马云为什么在外滩金融峰会上大骂监管部门？
马云在大佬云集的金融峰会批判传统金融。
他陈述：现有的金融监管体系太老旧了，不适合时代的发展外滩金融峰会；鉴于监管体系太老旧，应该放开监管。避免越监管越容易阻碍创新外滩金融峰会；要用区块链、云计算、大数据等这些“科技手段”构建未来的信用平台，抛弃传统金融机构的抵押质押手段。
这场演讲的主题围绕着电子金融，监管环境。还有行业创新。马云呼吁不要老想着在中国填补欧美行业空白，学人家老牌资本主义国家的巴塞尔协议金融监管和风险管理。
当然，马云在外滩大会上的讲话让科技企业振奋，也让传统金融部门感到愤怒，这种两极分化的舆论情绪说明科技企业与金融机构在竞争与合作当中产生的矛盾已经达到一个新的高度。科技公司的话语权从未如此之高，这也说明时代正在发生深刻的变化，金融市场的底层逻辑正在颠覆性改变。
近期数字货币的快速推进，意味着监管部门正在着力打造一个全新的金融科技基础设施。可以想见，中国社会将迎来一个数字科技时代。
如何看待马云今天在外滩金融峰会的演讲?
马云的演讲一向很具有煽动性，这次在外滩金融峰会上的演讲也不例外。乍一听，觉得马云的演讲干货满满，说得十分有道理，仔细品一品，也是妇孺皆知的大道理，没啥新意。不过，有一点值得“肯定”，马云确实敢说，说了好些人憋在肚子里已久的话。
这个社会从来不缺少指手画脚的人，马云在外滩那些“指手画脚”也同样不会引起太多好感。
马云抨击银行当铺思维，不应该抵押，向好企业贷款，把不缺钱的企业加杠杆给整死了。显然，是在用夸张的语言博取眼球。银行就是经营信用的企业，在当下的社会信用体系和科技手段下，以抵押物放贷这是社会现实必然的选择，也是银行无奈的选择。
抛开现实，用煽动性话语挑动大家情绪是一个演讲者的逻辑，但显然无法解决实际问题。资本是逐利的，这是资本的本质，马云显然是在混淆逻辑，哗众取宠。抛开本质，走极端，这也是一个高级演讲者惯用的伎俩。
关于创新和风险，马云在演讲中发表了不少看法。显然是一些套话和空话，而且格局和视角显然不够高。谁都知道创新有风险，谁都知道允许风险才有创新。
中国这样一个大国，不是一个蚂蚁金服，风险和创新必须做一个权衡，必须在稳健的基础上坚持创新。如果中国金融出现系统风险，其后果是不可估量的，不是轻描淡写几句话能解决问题的，其背后的政治因素，马云作为一个商人显然是无法知道的。
很多人看了马云的演讲，觉得说出了自己的心里话，替大家“一吐为快”。显然，商人马云没那个闲功夫。商人做任何事情都是有目的。马云这番高见，显然是有立场，也是充满商人思维的。很明显是希望国家把政策放得再开一些，他的生意更好做一些，至于会不会产生其他负面影响，他才懒得管。
马云上海外滩演讲内容?
在中国金融四十人论坛（CF40）联合各组委会成员机构举办的第二届外滩金融峰会上，马云以联合国数字合作高级别小组联合主席和联合国可持续发展目标倡导者的身份发表讲话。马云在演讲中，马云对全球的金融监管现状发出挑战，引起较大关注。
一直以来我们有一些思维上的惯性，比如总觉得要为了跟国际接轨，必须要做欧美发达国家有，而我们没有的所谓空白，要填补国内的空白。把填补空白当作追求的目标。我一直觉得填补空白这句话是有问题的，不是因为欧美的就是先进的，就是我们要去填补的。
其实今天我们不应该要和哪个东西接轨，适应哪国的标准，填补哪个空白，今天我们要思考的是怎么和未来接轨，怎么适应未来的标准，怎么弥补未来的空白，我们要想明白未来是如何的，以及自己到底要做成一个什么样的体系。
马云演讲内容总结
二战以后，世界需要恢复经济繁荣，布雷登森林体系建立起来，对全球经济的推动是巨大的；后来亚洲金融风暴发生，巴塞尔协议讲的风险控制越来越受重视，到后来变成了一个风险控制的操作标准。
现在的趋势越来是全世界变成了只讲风险控制，不讲发展，很少去想年轻人的机会、发展中的国家机会在哪里，这其实是导致今天世界的很多问题的根源。我们今天也看到巴塞尔协议本身也让欧洲的整体创新受到了很大的限制，特别是金融数字化方面。
巴塞尔比较一个老年人俱乐部，要解决的是运转了几十年的金融体系老化的问题，系统复杂的问题。但是中国的问题正好相反，不是金融系统性风险，而是缺乏金融生态系统的风险。
中国的金融和其他刚成长起来的发展中国家一样，在金融业是青春少年，还没有成熟的生态体系，没有完完全全的流动起来。
大银行更像是大江大河和血液的主动脉，但是我们需要湖泊、需要水塘，需要小溪小河，需要各种各样的沼泽地，缺少了这些生态系统，我们才会涝的时候涝死，旱的时候旱死，所以今天我们国家是缺乏金融系统的风险，不是金融系统性风险。
马丁·沃尔夫：拜登上台后的“变”与“不变”
“ 以美国为主导建立起来的战后全球机制，无法持续地维持和管理超级大国之间的关系，尤其是在经济与贸易领域 。”在第二届外滩金融峰会上，英国《金融时报》副主编及首席经济评论员马丁·沃尔夫（Martin WOLF）说道。
他表示，新冠疫情导致了20世纪30年代以来最严重的全球经济衰退，带来了剧烈震荡， 但疫情本身并不会带来新的变化，而只是此前既有趋势的加速剂 ——疫情爆发之前的很长一段时间里，全球不平等现象不断加剧，经济贸易自由化进程早已放缓。
他认为，各国“基本的共同利益”就是和平与繁荣，各国一要共同管理全球公域、应对气候变化等全球挑战，二要就如何应对全球挑战达成最低限度的协议，开展有纪律的、基于规则的合作。
特别地， 在贸易协商方面，超级大国需要就产业政策、知识产权、贸易开放、投资开放这四个主要领域重启谈判 。“在理想情况下，谈判是在国际多边框架下进行，而不是像特朗普政府那样，在纯双边的框架下进行。”马丁·沃尔夫表示。
谈及美国大选及其影响，马丁·沃尔夫称“it will change everything and nothing”——
它会改变一切，因为拜登政府会重新参与多边框架、重新加强与盟友的关系、重新参与应对气候变化等全球挑战、重新拥抱科学。
它什么都无法改变，因为美国仍然是一个严重分裂的大国，比过去更具防御性、更崇尚保护主义。最重要的是，比起过去，美国会对中国的 科技 发展等保持更加警惕的态度。
“总之， 我们面临的主要挑战是如何尽可能在多边框架下、在不导致国际关系完全崩溃的前提下，尽可能有效地管理国际关系。解决中美冲突是不可能的，但管理是可能的，更是必要的。 ”他强调。
以下为马丁·沃尔夫在第二届外滩金融峰会上的演讲全文 。
中文实录
我的基本观点是，我们当前面对的国际局势是前所未有的。
我接下来要谈的几个问题是：世界经济是如何走到今天这一步的？新冠疫情带来了哪些影响？在当前大国竞争的时代，全球治理将会如何演变、应该如何演变？区域主义（regionalism）在当前国际环境中扮演着怎样的角色？美国大选结果会产生怎样的影响？
首先谈谈基本观点——我们当前面对的国际局势是前所未有的。
自二战以来，世界上第一次出现了两个相互对抗的超级大国——它们在所有领域都堪称超级大国，且两国经济与世界经济紧密结合、彼此之间也深度融合。
这种关系与冷战有着根本不同 。冷战时期，美国乃至整个西方世界与苏联在经济上是完全割裂开来的。冷战实质上是战略和意识形态的竞争，这与现在的情况完全不同。现在的情况与后冷战时代也有着本质区别，因为从所有重要的领域来看，当时美国是唯一的超级大国。
今天的国际形势更像是一战前。工业革命之前，不可能出现当下的格局，因为当时还没有真正意义上的全球经济。但是，在一战前，世界上至少有五六个强国，都在一定程度上融入了世界经济，而且那时候，没有任何一个国家占绝对主导地位。当时的强国有英国、美国、德国、法国、俄罗斯和日本。20世纪初，中国还未能入列全球强国。
所以当前的国际局势是前所未有的。在此背景下，我们可以看出， 以美国为主导建立起来的战后全球机制，对于调节超级大国之间的关系并不十分奏效。
这些全球机制无法持续地维持和管理超级大国之间的关系，尤其是在大国关系最发达的领域——经济与贸易。
这种机制失能有五个根本原因：
第一 ，国际规则与机制的结构不完整，在贸易、技术和投资领域有着重要缺陷。
第二 ，目前的国际规则对超级大国行为构成的约束力非常薄弱，这是一个内在的、不可避免的缺陷。
第三 ，目前的国际规则无法迅速适应全球竞争格局发生的深刻变化。今天的中国早已不是2001年的中国了，但我们却未能及时应对这种变化、相应调整国际规则与大国关系。
第四 ，目前的国际规则从根本上深刻依赖于主权国家之间的信任，这是支撑其运作的根本。主权国家的合法权威与权力永远是支撑国际秩序的根本。
第五 ，恰恰是在我们最需要大家都信任的全球规则体系时，这种信任不可避免地会崩溃。就是因为这种信任的瓦解，国际规则体系才无法继续发挥作用。
第二个问题：长期来看，全球经济是如何演变的？新冠疫情在其中扮演什么角色？
毋庸置疑，新冠疫情产生了巨大的经济冲击，导致了20世纪30年代以来最严重的全球经济衰退，带来了剧烈震荡。比起以前，此次经济衰退对更多国家产生了不利影响。 与以往危机相比，今年预计会有更多的国家陷入衰退，经济大幅下滑。 也就是说，没有任何人能幸免。
预计中国将是今年唯一一个实现经济正增长的主要经济体，但也不会增长太多。我此前也提到，疫情将对经济产生长期影响，因为其冲击太强，会严重损害全球经济和各国经济。总体来看，目前的形势正在印证这一判断。
但我们需要更清楚地认识新冠疫情发生的背景——疫情来袭时，我们其实已经面对着诸多挑战。上一场金融危机仅仅过去了12年。因此，自20世纪30年代以来世界经济经历的最大两次震荡，都发生在这短短的12年间。
尤其是在西方世界，我们普遍未能恢复危机前的增长率，所以比起我们13、14年前设想的情况，我们目前实际上要穷得多。 同时，疫情爆发之前的很长一段时间里，全球不平等现象不断加剧，大多数人收入增长非常不理想，这种情况在很多国家——事实上在所有西方国家——都广泛存在，在美国尤为突出。
金融危机加上长期的不平等加剧，导致了西方国家民粹主义抬头，特朗普（的当选）集中体现了这一点。
事实证明，金融危机也成为了全球化进程包括贸易发展过程中的转折点。危机后，全球贸易增长经历了大幅放缓，再也未能恢复到危机前的活跃程度。
此外，我们要清楚，最近一次真正意义上的全球贸易自由化的重要事件是中国入世，而那已经是将近20年前的事了。因此， 早在金融危机之前——更是早在新冠疫情之前——经济贸易自由化进程就已经开始放缓了 。新冠疫情是全球经济经历的又一负面冲击。
第三个问题：新冠疫情产生了怎样的影响？
我认为疫情是此前所有既有趋势的加速剂。疫情本身并不会带来新的变化，只是加速了之前的各种变化。
疫情凸显了不平等现象，尤其是西方 社会 的不平等——疫情对欠缺专门技能的劳动力、年轻人、带孩子的母亲和少数族裔产生了更大的冲击，加剧了 社会 的不平等。
疫情也凸显了各国之间的深刻的不平等，特别是享有政策空间的国家和缺乏政策空间的国家之间的不平等；疫情极大地加速了 科技 的运用，让国际经济更迅速地适应、转向更加“虚拟”的当下与未来；疫情也加速了大国关系的破裂，其中最明显的一点就是各国就疫情问题相互推诿责任。
以上这些是显而易见的，但我还想强调， 我们目前还是面临着巨大的不确定性，不管是疫情的走向还是经济的发展 。这可能涉及到我们经历的这些震荡所产生的长期影响。
第四个问题：在当前大国竞争的时代，全球治理会如何演变？
我们需要对“基本的共同利益”有一个清晰的定义。我认为，各国“基本的共同利益”就是和平与繁荣。
第一，为了捍卫“繁荣”这一共同利益，我们需要共同管理全球公域（global commons）、应对全球挑战，特别是气候变化。
第二，各国需要就如何应对全球挑战达成最低限度的协议 ，才能维护和平与繁荣。根据过去的经验，要做到这一点，我们要需要开展有纪律的、基于规则的合作。
在贸易领域，超级大国需要在两个方面发力——
第一，它们需要在国内政策的自由度上达成更多的统一和一致， 主要包括技术空间（technology space）、调整过程（adjustment process）、暂时性保护（temporary protection）措施以及产业政策（industrial policy）四个领域的国内政策。各国应享有怎样的国内政策空间？应共同遵守怎样的规则？
第二，为了更好地管理上述领域的关系，需要在哪些重要国际规则上重启协商？这是超级大国需要考虑的问题。 鉴于中国当前的经济规模与近年来的发展，相关协商必然涉及到中国应承担怎样的责任。
贸易协商涉及四个主要领域：产业政策、知识产权、贸易开放、投资开放。我认为这些领域的规则都需要重新谈判。在理想情况下，谈判是在国际多边框架下进行的，而不是像特朗普政府那样，在纯双边的框架下进行。
我认为，关贸总协定、世贸组织的 历史 表明，大国在多边框架下达成协议要比在双边框架下容易得多，因为在双边框架下达成的协议中，总有一方会认为自己做出了“有失颜面的”（humiliating）妥协，没有任何一个国家愿意做出这种让步。
所以，我们该做什么、该怎么做其实已经很清晰了。当然，我对于取得实质性的进展并不特别乐观，但是我认为这是我们应该做的事。
第五个问题：区域主义（regionalism）在当前国际环境中扮演着怎样的角色？
我认为区域主义必定会不断增长，而且这会导致几个大问题。
全球性的大国有着全球性的利益，而这些利益不可避免地存在重叠和冲突。全球性大国没有纯粹的区域性利益，所以区域主义对它们来说永远不够。
当然，我们需要建立一定的规则，来管理区域关系，这恰恰就是世贸组织成立的初衷。否则，区域主义就会演变成围绕特定范围利益的战争，而区域之间的界限不可避免地会出现界定不清的情况。这也是美国政治家Cordell Hull推崇非歧视原则（non-discrimination）的原因。
最后一个问题：美国大选及其影响。
我认为，美国大选的结果会改变一切，同时，什么都无法改变（it will change everything and nothing）。
它会改变一切，因为拜登政府会重新参与多边框架、重新加强与盟友的关系、重新参与应对气候变化等全球挑战、重新拥抱科学。
它什么都无法改变， 因为美国仍然是一个严重分裂的大国，比过去更具防御性、更崇尚保护主义；最重要的是，比起过去，美国会对中国的 科技 发展等保持更加警惕的态度。
总之， 我们面临的主要挑战是如何尽可能在多边框架下、在不导致国际关系完全崩溃的的前提下，尽可能有效地管理国际关系。解决中美冲突是不可能的，但管理是可能的，更是必要的。
英文实录
It’s a tremendous honor to participate in this high-level discussion. I’m going to address the questions that we were asked by the organizers of this session in the Bund Summit, which I thought were very relevant.
They are very broad. So, I’ll deal with this in a broader, more strategic way than quite a few of the comments so far have done. I’m assuming we’ve already had some wonderful, detailed discussion of trade relations in many different areas and the politics associated with that. I’m going to try and present my overview of where we are. I’m going to make one statement and then address five questions.
My opening statement is that the situation we are in globally is essentially unprecedented. That’s important to understand. The questions I’m going to address are: How has the world economy got to where it is now? What is the legacy of COVID-19? How will or should global governance evolve in a time of great power competition? How does regionalism fit into this global context? And finally, what might be the implications of the US election?
The opening statement is that this is an unprecedented situation.
For the first time since World War II, we have in the world two rival superpowers. They are superpowers on all domains. They are also deeply integrated with the world economy and with each other.
This is fundamentally different from the Cold War when the US and the West more broadly were completely economically separated from the Soviet Union. So that was essentially just a strategic and ideological competition. This is something very different. This is also fundamentally different from the post-Cold War era when the US was the dominant power essentially in all important respects.
Today looks a bit like the pre-World-War-I situation. Nothing before the industrial revolution could have been like this, because that wasn’t really a global economy. But in that pre-World War situation, there were at least five great powers all integrated to some degree in the world economy and at that stage no one power was dominant. They were the UK, the US, Germany, France, Russia and Japan. China was essentially out of the world power system in the early 20th century.
So, the world we are in now is really different. In this unprecedented situation, it has become apparent that the global institutions which were created in the post-second-world-war era, largely under the US aegis, do not work very well for relations between superpowers.
These institutions have been unable to contain and manage the relations between the superpowers and particularly in the economic sphere where those relations were most developed, namely, trade. This inability to manage the relationships among the superpowers is so for five fundamental reasons.
First, the international structure of rules and institutions is incomplete. It has very important lacunae in trade, technology and investment.
Second, the disciplines that the international rules give on the behavior of superpowers is inherently and inevitably very weak.
Third, the rules cannot adjust quickly enough to profound changes in global competitiveness. The China of today is simply not the China of 2001. But we can’t adjust the rules and relations quickly enough to cope with this change.
Fourth, they depend profoundly and fundamentally on trust among the sovereign states that ultimately underpin them. It is always the legal authority and the power of sovereign states that underpins the global order.
Fifth, such trust inevitably collapses exactly when one most needs a global system of rules that people believe in. It is the breakdown of trust that makes it impossible for this to work. So that’s the first issue I wanted to address – the unprecedented situation we are in and the implications it has.
The second question is: how has the world economy evolved in the longer term and where does COVID-19 fit in?
COVID-19 is obviously an enormous economic shock. It has created the biggest global recession since the 1930s, a very brutal, sharp shock, and that recession seems to have affected more countries than ever before. This year more countries will be in recession or have big economic declines than probably ever before. That is to say everybody has been affected.
China looks like being the only large economy to grow this year, and it won’t be by very much. We risk suffering, as I argued in my column this week, from what I call a long economic COVID, that is a long economic legacy of the disease, because the shock is so big that it is doing an enormous amount of damage globally and domestically. This looks increasingly plausible.
But it is also vital to remember the background. COVID-19 came at us in a rather unfortunate context. We had a huge financial crisis only 12 years ago, so we’ve had the two biggest shocks to the world economy since the 1930s within just 12 years.
In the western world particularly, we have failed to recover pre-financial-crisis growth rates, and that’s pretty well universal, so we are much poorer than we thought we would be 13 or 14 years ago. That shock also followed a long period of rising inequality and weak income growth for most people in many of our economies - in fact, in all the western economies, in particular the US.The crisis then combined with that long period of rising inequality has had a marked populist legacy across the western world, of which Donald Trump is one key symptom.
The crisis also proved to be a turning point for globalization, including trade, with a marked slowdown in the growth of world trade since the financial crisis occurred. Again, it has never been as buoyant as it was before that crisis.
Finally, it is worth remembering that the last really big significant liberalization of trade was China’s WTO accession, which is now nearly 20 years ago. So, the liberalization thrust died long before the financial crisis, and long, long before COVID-19. This is another shock on top of many previous shocks.
The third question is: what is the legacy of COVID-19?
The way I think of it is that it is an accelerator of these prior trends. It is not so much something new. It’s mainly accelerating various prior changes. It has underlined deep inequalities particularly within western societies with a very unequal impact on the unskilled, the young, mothers with children, and minorities.
It has underlined global inequalities between countries, particularly those with policy space and those without. It has dramatically accelerated technological adoption, shifting the world economy more rapidly into our more “virtual” present and future. It has accelerated the breakdown in relations among the great powers, a post-pandemic “blame game” being the most obvious symptom of this breakdown.
While these things are reasonably clear it has to be stressed that there is a huge amount that remains uncertain about the future course of the disease and the economy. I’m guessing these are the longer-term implications of some of the shocks that we have experienced.
The fourth question is: how might global governance evolve in a time of great power competition?
It is necessary to define essential common interests. I define essential common interest as peace and prosperity. Prosperity includes successful sharing in the management of the global commons, notably the climate challenge.
My second key point is that it is essential to reach minimum agreements on how to manage those challenges, to preserve peace and to preserve prosperity. To do that, it would certainly, we know that from past experience, take disciplined and rules-governed cooperation.
In trade, the superpowers have to move on two fronts.
First, greater convergence and agreement on what freedom they need to have on domestic policy - the technology space, the adjustment process, the temporary protection issues, and the industrial policy issues. What freedoms do they need to have and what rules must they share?
Second, they need to consider re-negotiating crucial global rules governing these relations, which all have to include the question of what obligations China now has given its enormous scale and development.
There are four main areas for negotiation in the trade agenda area: industrial policy, intellectual property, openness to trade, and openness to investment. My view is these are all going to need to be renegotiated, but ideally in a global setting, not in a purely bilateral context as has happened under the Trump administration.
I believe that the history of the GATT/WTO shows that it is far easier for great powers to reach agreements in that multilateral setting than it is in a purely bilateral setting. Because concessions made in a bilateral setting are always seen as humiliating, and countries won’t make concessions that they see as humiliating.
So, the agenda is pretty clear and the way to do it is pretty clear. Obviously, I’m not terribly optimistic that it can be achieved, but I think it’s what we have to do.
The fifth question is: how does regionalism fit into this global context?
Regionalism is bound to increase, but it creates several huge problems. Global powers have global interests which unavoidably overlap and often conflict. There are no purely regional interests for global powers. So, regionalism is never enough for them. And there have to be rules governing the interaction of regional relationships. That’s what the WTO is for. Otherwise, regionalism turns into a war over spheres of interest, with inevitably unclear boundaries. This is why Cordell Hull promoted non-discrimination.
The last question is: what might be the implications of the US election?
My view is the outcome of the US election will change everything and nothing. It will change everything, because a Biden administration will re-engage multilaterally, seek to revitalize alliances, re-engage on core global challenges such as climate, and embrace science. It will change nothing because the US remains a deeply pided country and power, one that is far more defensive and protectionist than in the past. Above all, it will remain far more suspicious of China’s rising power, technological ambitions, political system and ideology.
To conclude, the challenge ahead of us is to achieve the best possible management of global relations within, if at all possible, a multilateral context, and without a total breakdown. Resolution of the tensions between the US and China is impossible, but management is possible and essential.
